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Abstract
We give graphical characterisation of the access structure to both classical and quantum
information encoded onto a multigraph defined for prime dimension q, as well as explicit
decoding operations for quantum secret sharing based on graph state protocols. We give a
lower bound on k for the existence of a ((k, n))q scheme and prove, using probabilistic
methods, that there exists α such that a random multigraph has an accessing parameter
k ≤ αn with high probability.
1 Introduction
In this work we consider encoding, and accessing, both quantum and classical information onto
graph states of qudits - multipartite entangled states which are one to one corresponding to
multigraphs (which we will consider as simple graphs with multiple edges). We are particularly
interested in using these states for secret sharing.
Secret sharing is an important cryptographic primitive, which was first put forward classi-
cally in [29], and then extended to the quantum realm in [17, 8]. The aim of the protocol is for
a dealer to distribute a secret (quantum or classical) to a set of players, in such a way that only
authorized sets of players can access the secret, and unauthorized sets of players cannot (there
may be sets of players which are neither authorized nor unauthorized). The sets of authorized
and unauthorized players is called the access structure. Any secret sharing scheme of n players
can be loosely paramaterised by two numbers, k and k′, such that any subset of k players is an
authorized set, whereas any subset of k′ players or less is unauthorized. We call such parama-
terised schemes (k, k′, n) ramp schemes. In the case when k′ = k − 1, we say it is a threshold
scheme, and simplify the notation to (k, n).
In this work we consider two classes of quantum schemes, one class using quantum channels
to distribute classical secrets, denoted CQ schemes [17], and the other sharing quantum secrets
[8, 17], denoted QQ schemes. The notation CQ and QQ used here follows the work [27, 24, 25],
where both classes were phrased in the same language of graph states (first for qubits [27] then
qudits [24, 25]). The equivalence of both schemes was shown in [25]. Using the graph state
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formalism can be useful both practically - since graph states are amongst the most well devel-
oped multipartite entangled states experimentally - and theoretically, since graph states are rich
in their uses in quantum information, and allow for graphical characterization of information
flow, and access of information. The connection between error correction and secret sharing
was understood early on [8], and implies that for general access structures it is necessary to use
high dimensional states to encode the secret [27, 25]. In [22] an entirely graphical description
of the access structure was given for the graph state protocols on qubits. This has led to many
applications, for instance in proving lower and upper bounds on what is k and k′ are possible in
ramp schemes. We are naturally interested in doing the same for higher dimensional versions.
The first result of this paper is to extend to higher dimension the characterisation of the
access structure in a graph, previously done in [22] for 2-dimensional system. By gathering the
graphical conditions and previous results, we show that the accessibility problem to quantum
information can be reduced to study the classical information’s one in both a set of player and
its complementary (which was proved in [22, 19] for 2 dimensional system). Finally we use
this result for the decoding phase of both QQ and CQ protocols, as we know [25] that a CQ
authorised is a QQ authorised set and vice versa. In the last part, we study the existence, as a
function of k, of a ((k, n))q scheme (this will be defined explicitly later, but can be understood
as the underlying graph encoding which gives rise to (k, n− k, n) QQ secret sharing schemes).
We derive a lower bound over k, that is, there exists α such that every (k, n − k, n) QQ secret
sharing must satisfies k > αn, and we use probabilistic method to find c < 1 such that a
((cn, n))q scheme exists with high probability.
2 Background
2.1 Qudit graph states, F∗q-graphs, and multigraphs
The qudit graph state formalism [1, 32] consists of representing a quantum state using a weighted
undirected graph where every vertex represents a q-dimensional quantum system and every
edge, which has assigned an element from the finite field Fq, represents intuitively the entan-
glement between the elementary systems (a formal definition is given in Definition 1). Such
graphs, labeled with elements of a finite field Fq, are known as F∗q-graphs [21] and can be can
be interpreted as edge-colored graphs. In this paper, we choose to interpret F∗q-graphs as multi-
graphs i.e., graphs with possibly parallel edges between pairs of vertices. Albeit equivalent to
the other interpretation of F∗q-graphs, we believe that the multigraph interpretation is relevant
in the context of qudit graph states for secret sharing protocols, in particular for the graphical
characterisation of authorised and unauthorised sets of players (see Lemmas 1 and 2).
Definition 1 (q-multigraphs). Given a prime number q, a q-multigraphG is a pair (V,Γ) where
V is the finite set of vertices and Γ : V ×V → Fq is the adjacency matrix ofG: for any u, v ∈ V ,
Γ(u, v) is the multiplicity of the edge (u, v) in G.
The term multigraph is used for q-multigraph when q is clear from the context or irrelevant.
In this paper, we consider undirected simple multigraphs G = (V,Γ) i.e., for any vertices
u, v ∈ V , Γ(u, v) = Γ(v, u) and Γ(u, u) = 0. For our characterizations of encoding and
accessing later on, it will be useful to introduce further concepts. We will see several examples
of them along the way, but for now we state definitions. Given a set V of vertices, a vector
D : V → Fq represents a multiset of vertices of V : for every v ∈ V , D(v) ∈ Fq is the
multiplicity of v in D. sup(D) = {v ∈ V | D(v) 6= 0 mod q} is the support of D. For any
multigraph G = (V,Γ) and any multiset of vertices D : V → Fq, the matrix product Γ.D
is the multiset of neighbours of D: for any v ∈ V , v is a neighbour of D with multiplicity
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(Γ.D)(v) =
∑
u∈V Γ(u, v).D(u) mod q. In particular, for any vertex u, Γ.{u} is the multiset
of neighbours of u. We call G[D] = (V ′,Γ′) the sub-multigraph of G = (V,Γ) induced by
the multiset D : V → Fq , where V ′ = V ∩ sup(D) and Γ′ : V ′ × V ′ → Fq = (u, v) 7→
D(u).Γ(u, v).D(v) mod q. Notice that the multiplicity of an edge in G[D] is the multiplicity
of this edge in the original graph G times the multiplicity in D of the two vertices connected by
this edge. For any A,B ⊆ V , Γ[A,B] denotes the submatrix of Γ whose columns correspond
to the vertices in A and rows to the vertices in B. Γ[A,B] represents the edges which have one
end in A and the other one in B.
Definition 2 (Qudit Graph State). Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ) with V = {v1, . . . , vn},
let |G〉 ∈ Cqn be its associated qudit graph state defined as
|G〉 = 1√
qn
∑
x=(x1,··· ,xn)∈Fnq
ω|G[x]||x〉
where ω is the qth root of unity and |G[x]| is the number of edges of the sub-multigraph
G[x] = (Vx,Γx) induced by x, where Vx = {vi ∈ V, xi 6= 0} and Γx : Vx × Vx → Fq =
(vi, vj) 7→ xixjΓ(vi, vj).
Qudit graph states satisfy the following fundamental fixpoint property. Given a q-multigraph
G = (V,Γ), |G〉 is the unique quantum state (up to a global phase) such that, for any u ∈ V ,
XuZΓ.{u}|G〉 = |G〉 (1)
where Γ.{u} is the multiset of neighbours of u, X = |b〉 7→ |b + 1 mod q〉, Z = |b〉 7→ ωb|b〉
are Pauli operators, and for any mulitset D : V → Fq , ZD :=
⊗
v∈V Z
D(v)
v .
Example 1. We define the 3-multigraph G = (V,Γ) by V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5},
Γ =


0 0 1 0 1
0 0 2 0 1
1 2 0 2 0
0 0 2 0 2
1 1 0 2 0

 v4
v5
v3
v1
v2
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
LetA = {v1, v2} be a subset of V , andD : A→ F3 a multiset such thatD(v1) = 2,D(v2) = 1.
That is D = {v1, v1, v2}. Then, with previous definitions, the graph induced by D is G[D] =
v1
v2
2 The multiset of neighbours of A is {v1, v2, v5, v5}. The multiset of neighbours of D is
{v1, v2, v2, v3}.
2.2 Local complementation and cut rank
The local complementation [5] is a graph transformation which is incredibly useful for the
study of graph states [31]. Indeed, if two graphs G and G′ are locally equivalent (i.e. one
can transform G into G′ by means of a series of local complementations), they represent the
same entanglement (i.e. there exists a local unitary transformation U such that |G′〉 = U |G〉)
[31]. Local complementation is extended to multigraphs as follows [21]: Given a q-multigraph
G = (V,Γ), u ∈ V and λ ∈ Fq, the λ-local complementation at u of G is the q-multigraph
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G⋆λu = (V,Γ′) such that ∀v, w ∈ V , v 6= w, Γ′(v, w) = Γ(v, w) + λ.Γ(v, u).Γ(u,w) mod q.
Keet et al. [24] have proved that for any q-multigraph G = (V,Γ), any u ∈ V and any λ ∈ Fq ,
there exists a local unitary transformation U such that |G⋆λu〉 = U |G〉.
The cut rank [28] is a set function which associates with every set B of vertices the rank
of the matrix describing the edges of the cut (B, V \B): Given a multigraph G = (V,Γ), let
Γ[B] := Γ[B, V \B] be the cut matrix of the cut (B, V \B), moreover for any A,B ⊆ V , let
rkG(A,B) := rank(Γ[A,B]) and cutrkG(B) := rkG(B, V \B) be the cut rank of B. Notice
that rkG(A,B) = rkG(B,A) and cutrkG(B) = cutrkG(V \B).
We point out in this paper that the cut rank, which is known to be invariant by local com-
plementation [21], is a key parameter of q-multigraphs for the study of secret sharing protocols
with qudit graph states. Indeed, Theorem 2 states that the capability of a set of players to re-
construct a quantum secret is characterised by the discrete derivative of the cut rank function.
Notice that the cut-rank of a bipartition is nothing but the Schmidt measure of entanglement of
this bipartition in the corresponding graph state. This is shown for the qubit case in [15], and
easily extends to the qudit case. As a consequence, Theorem 2 characterises the accessibility of
a set of players as the derivative of the Schmidt measure of entanglement.
2.3 Description of the encoding:
We now introduce the encoding of classical and quantum information onto graph states (CQ
and QQ respectively), which will be the starting point for the secret sharing protocols defined
in section 4. For ease of notation we present the CQ encoding as deterministic, and in one basis.
When used in the full CQ protocol this is randomised by measurement and choice of basis (de-
scribed fully in section 4). The ability of players to access encoded information (both classical
and quantum) is fully described in graph theoretical language in section 3.
CQ encoding:
Given a multigraph G = (V,Γ) of order n and a distinguished non isolated vertex d ∈ V , the
corresponding CQ encoding of a classical secret s ∈ Fq among n − 1 players consists of the
dealer preparing the state
|sL〉 := ZsΓ.{d}|G\d〉,
and sending one qudit to each player, where G\d = (V \{d},Γ[V \{d}, V \{d}]) is the multi-
graph obtained by removing the vertex d and all its incident edges.
In the CQ protocol (described in section 4) the secret s is randomised by measurement on
the dealer’s vertex d of the full graph state |G〉, and further, the encoding is randomised by
choice of measurement basis - the dealer chooses at random t ∈ T , T ⊆ Fq and |T | ≥ 2, and
measures his qudit in the associated complementary basis XtZ . Measuring in this t basis will
correspond exactly to using the above CQ encoding of the same secret value s onto the comple-
mentary multigraph G⋆td.
QQ encoding:
Given a multigraph G = (V,Γ) of order n and a distinguished non isolated vertex d ∈ V ,
the corresponding QQ encoding on a qudit graph state for sharing an arbitrary quantum secret
|φ〉 =∑q−1j=0 sj |j〉 ∈ Cq among n− 1 players consists, for the dealer, in preparing the state
|φL〉 =
q−1∑
j=0
sjZ
j
Γ.{d}|G\d〉 =
q−1∑
j=0
sj|jL〉
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and in sending one qudit of |φL〉 to each player.
Notice that the preparation consists in applying the map |j〉 7→ ZjΓ.{d}|G\d〉 which is an
isometry as long as d is not an isolated vertex in G. We describe encoding procedures in
appendix 7.
The accessing structure of the protocols (i.e. the description of the sets of players which can
recover the secret, as well as those which have no information about the secret) is given in the
next section which provides a graphical characterisation of the accessing structure for the secret
sharing protocols using these encodings. Moreover, the operations the authorised sets of players
have to perform to reconstruct the secret are also described in the next section.
3 Access Structure in a Graph in Higher Dimension:
3.1 Classical Information
In this section, we show, when the secret is classical, that the protocol is perfect (i.e. every set
of players is either able to recover the secret or has no information about the secret), and that
the accessing structure is graphically characterised by a simple rank-based function:
Theorem 1. Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ) and a distinguished vertex d ∈ V , a set B ⊆
V \{d} of players can recover a classical secret for the corresponding CQ encoding if and only
if πG(B, d) = 1, where
πG(B, d) := cutrkG(B)− cutrkG\d(B)
A graphical interpretation of Theorem 1 is that a set B is accessible if and only if the
presence of the ‘dealer vertex’ d increases the rank of the cut between B and the rest of the
vertices.
The rest of the section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 1.
First, we prove that a set B of players can recover a classical secret if, roughly speaking,
there exists a multiset D of them which is not ‘seen’ from outside except by the ‘dealer’:
Lemma 1. Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ) and d ∈ V , a set B ⊆ V \{d} of players
can recover a classical secret for the corresponding CQ encoding if there exists a multiset
D : B → Fq such that sup(Γ[B, V \B].D) = {d} i.e.,
• the number of neighbours of d in D is not congruent to 0 mod q;
• ∀u ∈ V \(B∪{d}), the number of neighbours of u in D is congruent to 0 mod q.
Proof. Given B ⊆ V and D : B → Fq such that sup(Γ[B, V \B].D) = {d}. W.l.o.g. we
assume the multiplicity of d in Γ.D is 1 (otherwise we consider the multiset D′ = u 7→
(Γ.D)(d)−1.D(u) instead of D). The players in B can recover the secret by measuring an ap-
propriate product of stabilizers. Indeed, there exists r ∈ Fq such that
∏
u∈B(XuZΓ.{u})
D(u) =
ωrXDZΓ.D = Zdω
rXDZΓ[V,V \{d}].D. As
∏
u∈B(XuZΓ.{u})
D(u)|G〉 = |G〉, we deduce that
ωrXDZΓ[V,V \{d}].D|G\d〉 = |G\d〉. If the classical secret is s ∈ Fq,
ωrXDZΓ[V,V \{d}].DZsΓ.{d}|G\d〉 = ωr−sZsΓ.{d}XDZΓ[V,V \{d}].D|G\d〉 = ω−sZsΓ.{d}|G\d〉.
So if the players in B measure according to ωrXDZΓ[V,V \{d}].D, they get the outcome−s mod
q, so they recover the classical secret s.
Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition for a set of players to be able to reconstruct a
classical secret. Notice that this reconstruction is nothing but a Pauli measurement, so it can be
done by means of local Pauli measurements and classical communications.
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Corollary 1. Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ), d ∈ V , and B ⊆ V \{d}, if πG(B, d) = 1
then B can reconstruct a classical secret for the corresponding CQ encoding.
Proof. Let F = V \(B∪{d}). According to lemma 1, B can recover a classical secret if there
exists D : B → Fq such that sup(Γ[B, V \B].D) = {d}. W.l.o.g. we can assume that the
multiplicity of d in Γ[B, V \B].D is one. So B can recover a classical secret if the system(
Γ[B, {d}]
Γ[B,F ]
)
.x =
(
1
0
)
has a non zero solution, which is equivalent to rank
(
Γ[B, {d}]
Γ[B,F ]
)
=
rank
(
Γ[B, {d}] 1
Γ[B,F ] 0
)
. Using the last column of the right-side matrix to cancel terms of
the row Γ[B, {d}], we are finally reduced to rank
(
Γ[B, {d}]
Γ[B,F ]
)
= 1 + rank(Γ[B,F ]) i.e.,
cutrkG(B)− rkG(B,F ) = 1 = πG(B, d).
In the following, a sufficient condition for a set of players to have no information about the
secret is introduced: roughly speaking, a multiset of players D which includes the dealer d, can
‘hide’ the secret to every player who is connected to D with a number of edges congruent to 0
modulo q:
Lemma 2. Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ) and d ∈ V , a set B ⊆ V \{d} has no information
about a classical secret for the corresponding CQ encoding if there exists D : V \B → Fq , such
that D(d) 6= 0 mod q and Γ[V \B,B].D = 0 i.e.,
• the multiplicity of d in D is not congruent to 0 mod q;
• ∀u ∈ B, the number of neighbours of u in D is congruent to 0 mod q.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume D(d) = 1 mod q. Notice that R|G\d〉〈G\d|R† = |G\d〉〈G\d|
with R =
∏
u∈V \(B∪{d}) (XuZΓ[V \{d},V \{d}].{u})
D(u)
. Moreover R.ZΓ.{u} is only acting on
V \(B∪{d}), so the reduced density matrix for the players in B is
TrV \(B∪{d})(ZsΓ.{d}|G\d〉〈G\d|Z†
s
Γ.{d})
= TrV \(B∪{d})((ZΓ.{d}R)
s|G\d〉〈G\d|(ZΓ.{d}R)†s)
= TrV \(B∪{d})(|G\d〉〈G\d|)
which does not depend on the secret, so the players in B have no information about the secret.
Corollary 2. Given a q-multigraph G = (V,Γ), d ∈ V , and B ⊆ V \{d}, if πG(B, d) = 0
then B has no information about the classical secret for the corresponding CQ encoding.
Proof. Let F = V \(B∪{d}). According to lemma 2, B has no information about classical
secret if there exists D : V \B → Fq such that D(d) = 1 mod q and Γ[V \B,B].D = 0, so
if Γ[F,B].C = −Γ[V,B]{d}, where C : F → Fq = u 7→ D(u) is the restriction of D to
F . As a consequence, B has no information about classical secret if the system Γ[F,B].x =
−Γ[V,B]{d} has a non zero solution, which is equivalent to find a non zero solution to the
system Γ[F,B].x = Γ[V,B]{d}, so if rank(Γ[F,B]) = rank(Γ[V \B,B]) i.e., πG(B, d) =
0.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Corollaries 1 and 2 and the fact that
for every B, 0 ≤ πG(B, d) ≤ 1. It proves that the encoding is perfect i.e., every set of players
is either able to reconstruct the secret (when πG(B, d) = 1) or has no information about the
secret (when πG(B, d) = 0).
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3.2 Quantum Information
In the following we prove that the accessibility of a set a players is characterised by the deriva-
tive of the cut-rank function with respect to the dealer.
Theorem 2. Given a q-multigraph G with a distinguished dealer d ∈ V (G), a set B ⊆
V (G)\{d} of players can recover a quantum secret in the corresponding QQ encoding iff
∂dcutrkG(B) = −1
where ∂dcutrkG(B) = cutrkG(B∪{d}) − cutrkG(B) is the discrete derivative of cutrkG in B
with respect to d.
Proof. It is known that B can access a quantum secret in G iff B can access a classical secret in
two mutual unbiased bases, say in G and G ∗1 d [25]. Moreover B can access a classical secret
in G iff πG(B, d) = 1, where πG(B, d) = cutrkG(B)− rkG(B, V \(B∪{d})).
(⇒) If B can access a quantum secret, B can access a classical secret and V \(B∪{d}) has no
information about a quantum secret [8], which implies that V \(B∪{d}) cannot access a classi-
cal secret. Thus πG(B, d) = 1 and πG(V \(B∪{d}), {d}) = 0. As a consequence πG(B, d)−
πG(V \(B∪{d}), {d}) = 1, so 1 = cutrk(B) − rkG(B, V \(B∪{d}))− cutrk(V \(B∪{d})) +
rkG(V \(B∪{d}), B) = cutrk(B)− cutrk(V \(B∪{d})) = cutrk(B)− cutrk(B∪{d}).
(⇐) If cutrkG(B) = cutrkG(B∪{d}) + 1, then πG(B, {d}) = 1, so B can access a clas-
sical secret in G. Moreover, since the cut rank is invariant by local complementation [21],
cutrkG⋆1d(B) = cutrkG⋆1d(B∪{d}) + 1, so B can also access a classical secret in G⋆1d.
Notice that for any set B of players, ∂dcutrkG(B) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}: if ∂dcutrkG(B) = −1, B
can recover the quantum secret; if ∂dcutrkG(B) = 1 they have no information since V \(B∪{d})
can recover the quantum secret; and if ∂dcutrkG(B) = 0 they have some partial information
about the secret.
Since the cut rank function is submodular [28], its derivative is monotonic (decreasing): if
B ⊆ B′, ∂dcutrkG(B) ≥ ∂dcutrk(B′). Indeed, if B can recover the secret, any superset B′ of
B can recover it too; and if B′ has no information about the secret, any subset B of B′ has no
information too.
4 Application to CQ and QQ protocols
We now see how the encoding of section 2.3, and the results on access structures in section 3
can be used to provide secret sharing protocols. Following the prescription of [25] (based on
[27, 24], see also [26]) we will now introduce two protocols, one for sharing classical secrets
over a quantum channel (CQ) and one for sharing a quantum secret (QQ), both based on a
graph state associated with a multigraph. Both protocols can be understood as using the graph
state as a channel between the dealer (associated with vertex d) and the players (the remaining
vertices). In the CQ case this channel is used to perform an Ekert-like key distribution protocol
between the dealer and authorised players, so that when completed the dealer and authorised
players will share a random ‘dit’ string which is unknown to anybody else. In the QQ case the
channel is used to teleport the secret to the players such that only authorised sets of players can
access the information (the QQ encoding in section 2.3 can be understood as this teleportation,
see Appendix 7). More details on the protocols and their relation to each other as well as error
correction can be found in [25].
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4.1 Detailed protocols
Before we write the full protocols out, we first review some background on the graph state
formalism, which will be the key in seeing how the stabilisers can be used to specify how
authorised sets can access the information, given the satisfaction of the conditions outlined in
the previous section.
Given a multigraph G = (V,Γ), we begin with an illustrative expansion of the graph state
|G〉V according to the d, V \{d} partition.
|G〉 = 1√
qn
∑
x=(x1,··· ,xn)∈Fnq
ω|G[x]||x〉V = 1√
q
∑
i
|i〉dZiΓ.{d}|G\d〉V \{d}
=
1√
q
∑
i
|i〉d|iL〉V \{d}
=
1√
q
∑
i
|i(t)〉d|i′L(t)〉V \{d},
for any t ∈ Fq , where the second line follows from definitions in section 2.3, correspond-
ing to the CQ encoding achieved by the dealer measuring in the Z basis. The third line cor-
responds to when the dealer measures in bases XtZ (explained in more detail later), where
they are defined as |i(0)〉 = |i〉, and |i(t)〉 = 1√
q
∑q−1
j=0 ω
j(j−t)
2t −it−1j |j〉 for t = 1...q − 1,
so that XtZ|i(t)〉 = ωi|i(t)〉, and further |i′(0)L〉 = |iL〉 = ZiΓ.{d}|G\d〉 and |i′L(t)〉 :=
1√
q
∑q−1
k=0 ω
−k(k−t)
2t +it
−1k|kL〉 for t = 1...q− 1. The state |i′(t)L〉V \{d} is equivalent to the CQ
encoding of i on graph G ∗t d [24].
We now look at how the conditions for access arrived at in section 3 can be used, along with
the stabiliser (or “fixed point”) condition (1), to eventually see how authorised sets can access
the information in the CQ and QQ protocols. We start with the QQ case, which is enough to
imply the CQ case (see [25]). Suppose a set of players B ⊂ V \{d} has access to quantum
information in a graph G = (V,Γ). We proved with Theorem 2 that B can access QQ encoded
quantum information in G if and only if B can access the CQ encoded classical information in
G and V \(B∪{d}) cannot. Thus, by rewriting lemma 1 and 2 applied to B and V \(B∪{d}),
we have: there exists D : B → Fq and C : B∪{d} → Fq such that C(d) = 1 and
sup(Γ[B, V \B].D) = {d} (2)
Γ[B∪{d}, V \(B∪{d})].C = 0 (3)
Now, call Ki = XiZΓ.{i} and ki = XiZΓ[V \{d},V \{d}]{i} (these are the fixpoint operators,
or stabilisers for graphs G and G\d respectively according to (1)).
First we have KC = Kd
∏
i∈BK
C(i)
i = XdZ
β
d .ZΓ.{d}
∏
i∈B k
C(i)
i with β = Γ.C(d). Then
ZΓ.{d}
∏
i∈B k
C(i)
i = ω
λ
∏
i∈B X
C(i)
i Z
Γ.C(i)
i , with λ =
∑
i,j∈B∪{d},j<i Γ(j, i)C(j)C(i).
Next KD satisfies KD =
∏
i∈BK
D(i)
i = Z
α
d
∏
i∈B k
D(i)
i , with α = Γ.D(d) 6= 0 since (2),
and
∏
i∈B k
D(i)
i = ω
λ′
∏
i∈B X
D(i)
i Z
Γ.D(i)
i , λ
′ =
∑
i,j∈B,j<i Γ(j, i)D(j)D(i).
Later we will suppose α = 1 (change D to α−1.D if necessary).
Hence KCtKD1−tβ |G〉
= ω
t(t−1)
2 βXtdZd.[ZΓ.{d}
∏
i∈B k
C(i)
i ]
t
[
∏
i∈B k
D(i)
i ]
1−tβ |G〉
= |G〉
which is a stabiliser / fixpoint equation involving operators only in d and B which will be used
to inform which measurements should be made to recover the secret in the CQ case, and how to
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find the QQ decoding operation. We can rewrite this as follows
[ZΓ.{d}
∏
i∈B k
C(i)
i ]
t
[
∏
i∈B k
D(i)
i ]
1−tβ
= ωc
∏
i∈B X
xi
i Z
zi
i with
xi(t) = tC(i) + (1− tβ)D(i) (4)
zi(t) = tΓ.C(i) + (1− tβ)Γ.D(i), (5)
c = tλ′ + (1− tβ)λ+ t(t− 1)λ′ + (1− tβ)(−tβ)λ + t(1 − tβ)
∑
i,j∈B
Γ(i, j)C(i)D(j) (6)
and we further define
ft(r) := −r − c− t(t− 1)
2
β. (7)
We can then see that given the state |G〉V , if the dealer measures XtZ , getting result ωs(t) and
each player i in B measures its qudit in the Xxi(t)Zzi(t) bases, denoting their results mi(t), if
we define m(t) = f−1t (
∑
imi(t)), then the fixpoint stabiliser conditions imply m(t) = s(t).
This will be the basis of the CQ accessing strategy.
For the QQ accessing, we define operators UB and VB only acting on B such that UB :=∏
i∈B k
−D(i)α−1
i , which satisfies UB|sL〉 = ωs|sL〉 and VB := ZΓ.{d}
∏
i∈B k
C(i)−βα−1D(i)
i ,
which satisfies VB|sL〉 = |(s+ 1)L〉.
We also define the extended Bell basis as the following bipartite states over a system {a, b}:
∀k, l ∈ Fq , |βk,l〉ab = ZkaX lb
∑
i∈Fq
|ii〉ab√
q
. The result (k, l) of a measurement over {a, b} in the
Bell basis yield the state as |βk,l〉ab.
CQ Protocol:
1. The dealer prepares the graph state
|G〉 =
q−1∑
i=0
1√
q
|i(t) 〉d|i(t)L〉V \{d}
and sends one qudit of the state to each player.
2. The dealer randomly measures its qudit among the bases: {XtZ}t∈T and denotes
the result ωs(t). That leaves the state over the players on |i(t)L〉V \{d}.
3. A player b ∈ B randomly chooses t′ ∈ T and send t′ to the other players in B using
their private channel.
4. Each player i in B measures its qudit in the Xxi(t′)Zzi(t′) bases (see (4),(5)) and
sends the result ωmi(t′) ∈ {1, ω, .., ωq−1} to b.
5. b computes m(t′) = f−1t′ (
∑
imi(t
′)) (see (7)).
6. Repeat step 1. 2. 3. p → ∞ times. The list of measurement results s(t) and m(t′)
are the raw keys of the dealer and players B respectively.
7. SECURITY TEST: Follow standard QKD security steps. Through public discussion
between d and B first sift the key followed by standard error correction and privacy
amplification to generate a secure key (see [25] and [30]).
Correctness : After the QKD security steps the dealer and the authorised set B will be able
to share a perfectly secure random key. Furthermore, QQ unauthorised sets for the same graph
will not be able to establish such a key (see [25] for proofs).
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QQ Protocol: Let |ζ〉S =
∑q−1
i=0 si|i〉S ∈ Cq be a quantum secret.
1. A dealer prepares the state
1√
q
∑
0≤i≤q−1
siZ
i
Γ.{d}|G\d〉V \{d}
2. The dealer sends one qudit of the resultant state to each player.
3. (measurement) The authorized set B uses two ancillas qudits {a1, a2} prepared in
the Bell pair state |β00〉a1a2 , and performs the following two commuting projective
measurement on a1, V −1B X
−1
a1
and UBZ−1a1 on , with result denoted k and l respec-
tively.
4. (correction)B applies ZkX−l over the second ancilla {a2}.
Correctness: UB and VB satisfy UB|iL〉V \{d} = ωi|iL〉V \{d}, and VB |iL〉V \{d} = |(i +
1)L〉V \{d} ∀i ∈ Fq . We can rewrite the state over V \{d}∪{a1, a2} as:∑
i∈Fq si|iL〉V \{d}
∑
j∈Fq
|jj〉a1a2√
q
.
= 1√
q
∑
l∈Fq IV \{d}X
l
a1
X la2
∑
i∈Fq |iLi〉V \{d}a1si|i〉a2
= 1√
q
∑
l∈Fq IV \{d}X
l
a1
X la2
∑
k∈Fq
∑
i∈Fq ω
k.i |iLi〉V \{d}a1
q
∑
j ω
−k.jsj |j〉a2
= 1√
q
∑
l∈Fq IV \{d}X
l
a1
X la2
∑
k∈Fq U
k
BIa1Z
−k
a2
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1
q
∑
j sj |j〉a2
= 1
q
∑
l,k∈Fq U
k
BX
l
a1
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1√
q
X la2Z
−k
a2
∑
j∈Fq sj |j〉a2)
As V −1B X−1a1 (U
k
BX
l
a1
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1√
q
) = ωkUkBX
l
a1
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1√
q
and
UBZ
−1
a1
(UkBX
l
a1
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1√
q
) = ωlUkBX
l
a1
∑
i∈Fq
|iLi〉V \{d}a1√
q
, the projective measure-
ment according to V −1B X−1a1 and UBZ
−1
a1
reveals the syndrome (k, l), such that the correction
ZkX−l over the ancilla {a2} leaves the state as
∑
i si|i〉a2 .
4.2 Example
We illustrate the use of characterisation of the access structure in a multigraph with a Reed
Solomon Graph State that allows a quantum secret (or equivalently a random key of dits) to be
shared between a dealer and all subset of at least n+12 players among a set of n players over
a field of q elements, with q ≥ n. We refer to [26], [8] for more details about Reed Solomon
Graph for secret sharing.
We saw B ⊂ V \{d} can access quantum information with respect to d in G iff there exist
D : B → Fq and C : B∪{d} → Fq such that C(d) = 1 and
sup(Γ[B, V \B].D) = {d}
Γ[B∪{d}, V \(B∪{d})].C = 0
We rewritte these conditions in the following way: B ⊂ V \{d} can access quantum infor-
mation in G iff there exist D : B → Fq and C : B ∪ {d} → Fq such that C(d) = 1 and{
B ∪ {u ∈ V \B | ∑v∈B D(v).Γ(u, v) 6= 0 mod q} = B ∪ {d}. (5)
B ∪ {d} ∪ {u ∈ V \(B∪{d}) | ∑v∈B∪{d} C(v).Γ(v, u) 6= 0 mod q} = B ∪ {d} (6)
For A : V → Fq , we call GA = (VA,ΓA) the subgraph induced by A such that:
VA = sup(A) ∪ {v ∈ V \sup(A) | Γ[sup(A), V \sup(A)].A(v) 6= 0 mod q
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(a) (4, 3, 7)7 Reed Solomon
QQ Graph scheme.
and D(v7) = 1
with B = {v7, v1, v2, v3}
GD, D : B → Fq
d
v7
v1
v2
v3
1
6
3
4
GC , C : d∪B → Fq
with C(d) = 1, C(v1) = 4
C(v2) = 3, C(v3) = 6
d
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v1
v2
v3
1
6
3
4
and D(v6) = 3, D(v7) = 1
with B = {v6, v7, v2, v3}
GD, D : B → Fq
d
v6
v7
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v3
5
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5
3
GC , C : d∪B → Fq
with C(d) = 1, C(v2) = 1,
C(v3) = 3
d
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v2
v3
4
1
45
5
1
(b) Examples of subgraphs GD associated with subset
B showing that B can access classical information in
G and of subgraphs GC associated with d∪B showing
that V \B cannot have classical information in G .
Figure 1: Checking quantum accessibility in a (4, 3, 7)7 Reed Solomon Graph.
B (D(b))b∈Bs (C(b))b∈d∪B B (D(b))b∈Bs (C(b))b∈d∪B
{v7, v1, v2, v3} (1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 6, 0, 0) {v6, v1, v2, v3} (1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 2, 2, 1)
{v5, v1, v2, v3} (1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 3, 4, 1) {v4, v1, v2, v3} (1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 4, 6, 2)
{v6, v7, v2, v3} (3, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 3) {v6, v7, v1, v2} (1, 4, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 3, 6)
{v6, v7, v1, v3} (4, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 5, 5) {v5, v7, v2, v3} (3, 4, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 6, 1)
{v5, v7, v1, v2} (1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 2, 1) {v5, v7, v1, v3} (4, 3, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 4)
{v4, v7, v2, v3} (4, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 2, 2) {v4, v7, v1, v3} (3, 4, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 6, 1)
{v5, v6, v1, v2} (3, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 3) {v5, v6, v1, v3} (1, 6, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 4, 3)
{v5, v6, v7, v3} (2, 2, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 2) {v5, v6, v7, v2} (4, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 5)
{v5, v6, v7, v1} (5, 6, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 6) {v4, v5, v7, v3} (1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 6)
{v4, v5, v7, v1} (4, 6, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 3) {v4, v5, v7, v2} (6, 1, 4, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0, 3)
{v4, v5, v6, v7} (5, 6, 1, 2) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
Table 1: List of typical subsets B of 4 players in the Reed Solomon Graph State described
in Fig 1a. For each B, B∪{u ∈ V \B | ∑v∈B D(v).Γ(u, v) 6= 0 mod q} = B∪{d} =
B∪{d}∪{u ∈ V \(B∪{d}) | ∑v∈B∪{d} C(v).Γ(v, u) 6= 0 mod q}, meaning that B can
access quantum information, whereas V \(B∪{d}), that is all subset of 3 players, cannot. (The
remaining subsets are covered by symmetry.)
and ∀vi ∈ sup(A),
{
ΓA(vi, vj) = A(vi)A(vj).Γ(vi, vj) if vj ∈ sup(A)
ΓA(vi, vj) = A(vi)Γ(vi, vj) if vj ∈ VA\sup(A)
For example, let G = (V,Γ), d ∈ V , |V | = 8, be the (4, 3, 7)7 Reed Solomon Graph State
given in Fig 1a.
Such a graph can be used by dealer d to encode any quantum secret |ξ〉 ∈ C7 and share
it between 7 players such that all subset of at least 4 players can recover the secret, whereas
any subset of 3 players or less cannot have any information about it. We can reprove this result
using the previous graph characterisation, that is by checking if conditions (5) (6) are satisfied
in a basis G for all subset B ⊂ V \{d} of 4 players. In fig 1b, we give the relevant induced
subgraphs for thee different subset B. And in table 1 we give a list of relevant multi subset
D : B → Fq and C : B∪{d} → Fq for typical subsets B of four players.
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5 Existence of ((k, n))q scheme
In this section, we focus on the properties of the secret sharing scheme realised by a given
Fq-graph, as well as the existence of Fq-graphs realising a given secret sharing protocol. A
Fq-graph G of order n with a particular dealer d is said to realise a ((k, n))q scheme if k− 1 =
maxB⊆V \{d}(∂dcutrkG(B) ≥ 0). In other words, G realises a ((k, n))q scheme if all sets of
at least k players can recover a quantum secret and there exists a set of k − 1 players which
cannot. A Fq-graph which realises an ((k, n))q scheme can be used as an (k, k′ ≥ n − k, n)q
CQ protocol or (k, n − k, n)q QQ protocol as described in section 4 (note that they can also
be used for (k, k′ ≥ n − k, n)q schemes to share a quantum secret using hybrid protocols (e.g.
[4, 19, 10, 11])).
5.1 Finding new schemes
Theorem 2 offers a combinatorial characterisation of quantum accessibility, and raises as a
consequence several questions about the complexity of deciding: (i) whether a given set of
players can access a quantum secret in a given q-multigraph? (ii) whether a given q-multigraph
realises a ((k, n)) protocol? (iii) whether, given q, n and k, there exists an Fq-graphs realising
a ((k, n)) protocol?
Problem i Given an Fq-graph G of order n with a particular dealer d and a set B of k players,
deciding whetherB can access a quantum secret consists of deciding whether ∂dcutrkG(B) =
−1. This can be decided efficiently since ∂dcutrkG(B) is computed in O(nk1.38) opera-
tions using the Gaussian elimination for computing the rank [6, 18].
Problem ii Given a Fq-graph G of order n and α ∈ [0, 1], deciding whether G is a ((αn, n))
scheme can be done by enumerating all the
(
αn
n
)
sets of players of size αn and for each
of them deciding whether they can access a quantum secret. It leads to O(n2.382nH2(α))
operations. This problem is NP-complete, as it has been shown to be NP complete when
q = 2 [7], and also hard in terms of parameterised complexity as it is hard for W [1] [7].
Problem iii Given n, α, and q, deciding whether there exists a ((αn, n)) Fq-graph? A brute-
force approach consists in enumerating all the q
n(n−1)
2 Fq-graphs of order n and then
decide whether they realise a ((αn, n)) protocol. It leads to O(q
n(n−1)
2 n2.382nH2(α))
operations. This can be implemented for small values of n only and permits to prove that
there is no (4, 3, 7)3 QQ secret sharing with qutrit graph state.
Solving problem i can be done with the similar algortihm C of [12]. Note that for one thing, the
later is more general and can be applied to input states (that is quantum secrets) and to multi-
graphs of arbitrary dimension (not necessarily prime number). For another thing, it concerns
rather the access to partial information. Also it is not optimised for problem i of our particular
interest.
In the following sections, we develop a different approach for deciding the existence of
((αn, n)) Fq-graphs realising. We show an upper and a lower bound on the minimal α such that
there exists an Fq-graph realising a ((αn, n)) protocol. The upper bound (Theorem 3) is based
on non constructive probabilistic methods, whereas the the lower bound (Theorem 4) is based
on a counting argument.
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5.2 Existence of q-multigraphs realising ((αn, n))q schemes
In this section, we prove a Gilbert-Varshamov-like result: for any α such that Hq2(1 − α) < 12
there exists a q-multigraph realising a ((αn, n))q scheme. The proof is using probabilistic meth-
ods and is, as a consequence, non constructive. However, we prove that a random q-multigraph
satisfies such ((αn, n))q scheme with high probability as long as Hq2(1 − α) < 12 .
Lemma 3. For any q-multigraphG = (V,Γ) of order n, and anyα ∈ [0.5, 1], if for any multiset
C : V → Fq , |sup(C)∪sup(Γ.C)| > (1 − α)n then for any d ∈ V and any B ⊆ V \{d} such
that |B| ≥ αn, ∂dcutrkG(B) = −1.
Proof. For any B ⊆ V such that |B| ≥ αn, ker(Γ[V \B]) = {0}, otherwise there would
be a multiset C such that sup(C) ⊆ V \B and |sup(C)∪sup(Γ.C)| ≤ (1 − α)n. So for any
B ⊆ V such that |B| ≥ αn, cutrkG(B) = n − |B|. As a consequence, for any d ∈ V and
any B ⊆ V \{d} such that |B| ≥ αn, ∂dcutrkG(B) = n − |B∪{d}| − (n− |B|) = −1. Thus
∂dcutrkG(B) = −1
A random Fq-graph G(n, 1/q) is a Fq-graph of order n such that, for every pair of vertices
u and v, the number of edges between u and v is chosen uniformly at random in Fq .
Theorem 3. Given q ≥ 2, and α ∈ [0.5, 1] such thatHq2 (1−α) < 12 , for any n ∈ N, a random
q-multigraphG(n, 1/q) realises a ((αn, n))q scheme with probability 1−2Ω(n), where d is any
vertex of G(n, 1/q).
Proof. Let Cα = {C : V → Fq, |sup(C)| ≤ (1 − α)n}. For any C ∈ Cα, let AC be the (bad)
event |sup(C)∪sup(Γ.C)| ≤ (1− α)n.
For any C ∈ Cα, Pr(AC) = 1q(1−c)n
∑(1−α−c)n
k=0
(
(1−c)n
k
)
(q − 1)k where c = |sup(C)|/n, and∑
C∈Cα Pr(AC) =
∑(1−α)n
j=0 f(j) with f(j) =
∑
Cs.t.|sup(C)|=j Pr(AC).
In the following, we show an upperbound on f(k). For any c ∈ [0, 0.5], f(cn) = ( n
cn
)
(q −
1)cn 1
q(1−c)n
∑(1−α−c)n
k=0
(
(1−c)n
k
)
(q−1)k ≤ (q−1)cn
q(1−c)n
2nH2(c)+(1−c)nH2(
1−α−c
1−c )(q−1)(1−α−c)n =
2ng(c) where g(c) = H2(c) + (1 − c)H2( α1−c ) + (1− α) log2(q − 1)− (1− c) log2(q). g′(c) =
− log2(c)+ log2(1−α− c)+ log2(q), so g′(c) = 0 ⇐⇒ c = qq+1 (1−α). As a consequence,
g(c) ≤ g( q
q+1 (1 − α)) = −α log2(α) − (1− α) log2(α) + (1 − α) log2(q2 − 1)− log2(q) =
log2(q)(2Hq2(1 − α) − 1). Thus,
∑
C∈Cα Pr(AC) ≤ (1 − α)nqn[2Hq2 (1−α)−1], so, thanks
to the union bound, Pr(
⋂
C∈Cα AC) ≥ 1 − (1 − α)nqn[2Hq2 (1−α)−1] = 1 − 2Ω(n) when
2Hq2(1 − α) − 1 < 0. So according to lemma 3, κQ(G, d) ≤ αn for any vertex d when
Hq2(1 − α) < 12 .
Theorem 3 extends the upper bound of the binary case (q = 2) [19]. Notice that even if
a random Fq-graph realises a ((αn, n))q scheme with probability almost 1, double checking
whether a (randomly chosen) Fq-graph actually realises a ((αn, n))q scheme is a hard task (see
Problem (ii) in section 5.1).
5.3 Lower bound on quantum accessibility
The no cloning theorem implies that for any ((αn, n)) secret sharing protocol, α > 0.5. In the
following we improve this lower bound for secret sharing schemes based on qudit graph states.
The lower bound on α depends on the dimension q (see Theorem 4), the value of the lower
bound is plotted for small values of q in figure 2.
The lower bound is based on the properties of the kernel with respect to the dealer defined
as follows:
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Definition 3. Given a q-multigraph G, for any d ∈ V (G) and any B ⊆ V (G)\{d}, let
Sd(B) = ker(ΓG[B∪{d}])\ ker(ΓG[B]) be the kernel of B with respect to d.
Lemma 4. Given a q-multigraphG, for any d ∈ V (G) and anyB ⊆ V (G)\{d}, if ∂dcutrkG(B) =
−1, there exists C ∈ Sd(B) such that
|sup(C)| < q
q + 1
cutrkG(B)
Proof. Since cutrkG(B∪{d})−cutrkG(B) = −1, dim(ker(ΓG[B∪{d}]))−dim(ker(ΓG[B])) =
2. Moreover, ker(ΓG[B]) ⊆ ker(ΓG[B∪{d}]), so |Sd(B)| = (q2 − 1).qt where t = dim(ker(
ΓG[B])). Let M =
(
I
M ′
)
a matrix in standard form (or reduced column echelon form) gener-
ating ΓG[B∪{d}]. Since |Sd(B)| = (q2 − 1).qt and | ker(ΓG[B∪{d}])| = qt+2, there exist
two columns C1 and C2 of M such that ∀(x, y) ∈ [0, q − 1]2\{(0, 0)}, x.C1 + y.C2 ∈ Sd(B).
Notice that since M is in standard form, |sup(C1)∪sup(C2)| ≤ |B|+ 1 − t. Moreover for any
v ∈ sup(C1)∪sup(C2), v has a zero multiplicity in q−1 vectors of the q2−1 linear combinations
x.C1 + y.C2 for x, y ∈ [0, q − 1]\{(0, 0)}, so
∑
(x,y)∈[0,q−1]2\{(0,0)} |sup(x.C1 + y.C2)| =
(q2 − 1 − (q − 1)).|sup(C1)∪sup(C2)|, so there exists C ∈ Sd(B) such that |sup(C)| ≤
q2−q
q2−1 (|B|+ 1− t) = qq+1 (cutrkG(B) + 1) < qq+1cutrkG(B).
Theorem 4. If a q-multigraph G of order n realises a ((αn, n))q scheme, then
(
n
(1−α)qn
q+1
)(
αn
(2α− 1)n
)
≥ (2α− 1)(1− α)
2
(
n
αn
)
Asymptotically, as n tends to infinity, α satisfies:
H2(
αq + 1
q + 1
) + αH2(
1− α
α
) ≥ H2(α)
Proof. GivenB0 of size αn, according to lemma 4 there existsC0 ∈ Sd(B0) such that |sup(C0)| <
q
q+1 (1− α)n. Notice that the set sup(C0)∪sup(ΓG.C0) has some partial information about the
secret so |sup(C0)∪sup(ΓG.C0)| ≥ (1 − α)n. Moreover for any B of size αn, if C0 ∈ Sq(B)
then sup(C)∪sup(ΓG.C) ⊆ B. So there are at most
(
n−1−(1−α)n
αn−(1−α)n
)
=
(
αn−1
(2α−1)n
)
sets B ⊆
V \{d} of size αn such that C0 ∈ Sd(B). For any B of size αn there is a C which support
is of size at most q
q+1 (1 − α)n − 1, any every such C is associated with at most
(
αn−1
(2α−1)n
)
such Bs, so a counting argument implies
(
n−1
αn
) ≤ ( αn−1(2α−1)n)∑
q
q+1 (1−α)n−1
i=1
(
n−1
i
)
. More-
over,
∑ q
q+1 (1−α)n−1
i=1
(
n−1
i
) ≤ 1+αq
q(2α−1)
( n−1
(1−α)qn
q+1 −1
)
= (1−α)(1+αq)(2α−1)(q+1)
(
n
(1−α)qn
q+1
)
. So, (
n
αn)
( αn(2α−1)n)
=
α
(1−α)2
(n−1αn )
( αn−1(2α−1)n)
≤ α(1+αq)(2α−1)(1−α)(q+1)(
n
(1−α)qn
q+1
) ≤ 2(2α−1)(1−α)( n(1−α)qn
q+1
)
.
Since 2n(H2(p)+o(1)) ≤ ( n
pn
) ≤ 2nH2(p), asymptotically, as n tends to infinity, α satisfies
the equation H2(αq+1q+1 ) + αH2(
1−α
α
) ≥ H2(α).
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Figure 2: Lower bound on the accessibility to quantum information in a ((k, n))q scheme. There
is no ((k, n))q scheme with k ≤ αn
6 Discussion
In this work we have studied the encoding of classical and quantum information onto graph
states of qudits, and its application for secret sharing schemes. We have given complete graph-
ical characterization of which sets of vertices (players) can access the information, and shown
how this can be done both for classical and quantum information. Using this characterization
we have given bounds on which protocols are possible and how difficult the access structure is
to calculate given a graph.
Whilst we have focused on the application of our results for secret sharing, there may be ap-
plications to other quantum information protocols. Indeed, the QQ encoding defined in section
2.3 is exactly the same encoding procedure used in measurement based quantum computing
and error correction, so we can expect that these results have implications in both these do-
mains. Furthermore, quantum secret sharing is intimately linked to error correction [25, 8]. All
secret sharing schemes are error correcting schemes, and the QQ protocols presented here are
equivalent to all possible stabilizer codes [25]. Thus, the existence of ((αn, n)) protocols is
an existence statement about error correcting protocols too, and the no goes on secret sharing
imply no-goes for all stabilizer codes - so that there are no stabilizer codes with parameters
violating our lower bounds.
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7 Appendix-QQ Encoding-Decoding Operations
The QQ encoding-decoding can basically be done by three typical ways. The first method
is based on projective Bell measurements (possibly extended to an |B| + 1 length state) and
the two last one are accessible by local measurements and/or implementation of control op-
erations between two qudits, which should finally result in a similar experimental complexity.
We briefly describe the three encoding method E1, E2, E3 and decoding D2, D3. (D1 has
been done in section 4.1). For a graph G = (V,Γ), with d ∈ V , W := V \{d}, a quan-
tum secret |ξ〉S :=
∑q−1
i=0 si|i〉S , we write X¯ := ZΓ{d} and Z¯ := (XuZΓ{u})−Γ(u,d)
−1
,
for u,Γ(u, d) 6= 0, as they act like logical operators over the bases states over W , that is
Z¯|iL〉 = ωi|iL〉, X¯|iL〉 = |(i + 1)L〉 with notation of 4.1.
E1 |ξ〉|G〉 =∑i∈Fq si|i〉S∑j∈Fq |j〉D |jL〉W√q
= 1√
q
∑
i,j∈Fq |i〉S |j〉Dsi|jL〉W = 1√q
∑
l∈Fq ISX
l
DX¯
l
W (
∑
i∈Fq |i〉S |i〉Dsi|iL〉W )
= 1√
q
∑
l∈Fq ISX
l
DX¯
l
W (
∑
k∈Fq
∑
i∈Fq ω
k.i |i〉I |i〉D
q
∑
j ω
−k.jsj |jL〉W )
= 1√
q
∑
l∈Fq ISX
l
DX¯
l
W (
∑
k∈Fq Z
k
I IDZ¯
−k
W
∑
i∈Fq
|i〉I |i〉D
q
∑
j sj∈Fq |jL〉W )
= 1
q
∑
l,k∈Fq Z
k
SX
l
D(
∑
i∈Fq
|i〉S |i〉D√
q
)X¯ lW Z¯
−k
W
∑
j∈Fq sj |jL〉W )
so that applying the correction: Z¯kX¯−l over V \{d}, according to the syndrom (l, k) of a Bell
measurement over {S,D}, leaves the state over W as∑i∈Fq si|iL〉.
E2 CX¯dW (
∑
i∈Fq si|i〉)|0L〉 =
∑
i∈Fq si|i〉X¯ i|0L〉 =
∑
i∈Fq si|iiL〉 =
∑
i∈Fq siX
i|0〉|iL〉
=
∑
i∈Fq siX
i
∑
j∈Fq
|bj〉√
q
|iL〉 =
∑
i∈Fq siX
i
∑
j
Z−j |b0〉√
q
|iL〉 = 1√q
∑
i,j siω
i.jZ−j|b0〉|iL〉
=
∑
j∈Fq
|bj〉√
q
(Z¯j
∑
i∈Fq si|iL〉)
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where | bk 〉 = Zk
∑
i |i〉 constitutes the X basis (|b0〉 = |+〉). so that the correction Z¯−i over
W , according to a X id measurement leaves the state to distribute as
∑
i si|iL〉. [2]
E3 CZ¯dWHdCX¯dW (
∑
i si|i〉)|0L〉 = CZ¯dWHd(
∑
i si|i〉|iL〉)
= CZ¯dW (
∑
i si|bi(q)〉|iL〉) = |+〉
∑
i si|iL〉)
The same process can be done for the decoding by an authorised set B, where the operators
UB and VB defined in 4.1 will act as Z¯ and X¯ operators respectively. An ancilla qudit {a} is
prepared in the state |+〉a by B.
D2. CV −1aB|+〉a(
∑
j∈Fq sj |jL〉W ) = 1√q
∑
k∈Fq X
−k
a (
∑
i∈Fq si|i〉a)|kL〉W
D3. CUaB.Ha. 1√q
∑
k∈Fq X
−k(
∑
i∈Fq si|i〉a)|kL〉W =
∑
i∈Fq si|bi〉a
∑
k∈Fmq
|kL〉W√
q
The explicit two qudits gate control operations B has to perform are given by decoding param-
eters (xi, zi, c) defined in 4.1.
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